Is the Gold Standard set to make a return and is that return inevitable?

The answer must be yes to the first question and an interestingly qualified yes to the second.

There is little to no consensus amongst politicians and academics that the crisis we are passing through is a crisis of paper money, but even the most died-in-the-wool quantitative easer cannot but notice that QE is (a) a stop-gap and (b) that the gap refuses to be stopped.

Academic Blindness

Part of the perhaps inability to see that this is the paper money crisis to end paper money crises, is the hold that the consensus as to what caused the Great Depression has on such a wide range of academics and policy makers, the most important exponent being Ben Bernanke.

While faulty analysis is to be blamed for the position that Bernanke assigns to gold in the Great Depression, this position is also the result of the fallacy of assuming that the coincidence of two things necessarily entails cause and effect, in this case that because the gold standard existed at the same time as the Great Depression, ergo the gold standard caused the depression.

As James Rickards points out in his exceptionally informative book, Currency Wars (Portfolio/Penguin, New York, 2011), Bernanke’s argument depends on the observation that “[c]ountries that left gold were able to reflate their money supplies and price levels, and did so after some delay; countries remaining on gold were forced into further deflation.” (Bernanke, “The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27, 1995). Rickards extrapolates: “Gold was at the base of the money supply; therefore gold was the limiting factor on the expansion of money at a time when more money was needed. … the evidence showed that gold had helped to cause the Great Depression and those who abandoned gold first recovered first. Gold has been discredited as a monetary instrument ever since. Case closed.”

But, while this academic case against gold is proved beyond controversy in the minds of policy makers, it is simply untrue. It was policy decisions that caused the problems: “As gold flowed into the United States during the early 1930s, the Federal Reserve could have allowed the base money supply to expand by up to 2.5 times the value of gold. The Fed failed to do so and actually reduced money supply, in part to neutralise the expansionary impact of the gold inflows.”

This then was what the Fed chose to do, and as a policy option was actually independent of the supply of gold. “It is historically and analytically false to blame gold for this money supply contraction.”

Bernanke’s Real Fear of Gold

“One suspects that Bernanke’s real objection to gold today is not that it was an actual constraint on increasing the money supply in the 1930s but that it could become one today. … [He] may want to preserve the ability of central bankers to create potentially unlimited amounts of money, which does require the abandonment of gold. Since 2009, Bernanke and the Fed have been able to test their policy of unlimited money creation in real-world conditions.” [Emphasis in the original.]

With the Bank of England recently following hard on the heels of the Fed. Pun intended. And one should note that the word “creation” in this context is an irony… but one that is almost certainly lost on those with an academic agenda to pursue: Mr Rickards’s last sentence above is a masterpiece of understatement!

Rickards summarises his conclusions on the false attribution of the Depression to gold thus: “the crime of tight money was not committed by gold but by the central bankers who engaged in a long series of avoidable policy blunders.” (Readers are well advised to get hold of Mr Rickards’s book: his analysis of the inaccuracies of the enemies of gold is extremely well done – as is the rest of this very important book.)

Which brings us up to date: avoidable blunders by policy makers. For how long have we been reading headlines that essentially declare Greece/Italy/Spain/the euro/the EU all to be teetering on the brink, when it is quite obvious that they are all well over the cliff and clutching at clouds to reassure themselves even as they plummet.

How does the current situation presage a return to the gold standard?

The gold standard must return, and in one of two ways. Either it is deliberately courted through enquiries as to the best form it should take and how it should be introduced, whether unilaterally at first, or in some form of international cooperation, or a unilateral introduction leading to other economies tagging along, pegging their currencies to a revitalised dollar anchored to a clearly defined gold standard… the options are adroitly canvassed by Mr Rickards.

Or, in the interestingly qualified yes to the question as to its inevitable return, it is reintroduced on the sudden as part of the emergency procedures that the President of the United States adopts to halt the chaos resulting from the unwillingness of politicians and economists and central bankers to do anything about the paper money crisis until it is too late.

Mr Rickards is extremely good on the possible agendas that will result from the present impasses: paper, in the form of multiple reserve currencies and Special Drawing Rights; Gold; or Chaos – with gold making its back door entrance as an emergency measure because by that time nobody will be able to stop it. And true to that emergency requirement, of course, gold will make its entrance by way of confiscation and the prohibition of all exports of gold from the States.

So if gold is going to make a comeback anyway, why wait? Why not prepare for its orderly reintroduction now, which will have the effect of avoiding the chaotic melt-down of value that will otherwise ensue?

“A studied, expertly implemented return to the gold standard offers the best chance of stability but commands so little academic respect as to be a nonstarter in current debates.”

In other words, there are none so blind as those who will not see.

Currency Wars

Mr Rickards has written an immensely important book. He is dry and unalarmist; he is not scaremongering – the situation is already too scary for that. His recommendations are measured, and as a plea for a change of mind and heart are couched in terms of compromise – for example, he insists that the only way to defeat the Bernanke thesis is for gold advocates to take it seriously and argue the evidence on its own terms, something which he does brilliantly.

He is also illuminating on how the gold standard can live comfortably with occasional central bank manipulation of the money supply – indeed his argument with Bernanke shows just how it was the failure to do this that caused the problems that Bernanke and co. blame on gold – but in such emergency circumstances that gold will still act as a constraint on the possible solutions – i.e. will keep the interventions in check. As well as, I would say, provide the yard-stick by which such interventions can be properly evaluated as necessary.

He even suggests reviving Keynes’s suggestion, made at Bretton Woods, for an internationally gold-backed currency; he goes further and suggests that Keynes’s rather inelegant name for this substance, the “bancor”, could be adopted. Now there’s an olive branch for you.

If only Keynes had not held all his other prejudices against gold… his thinking seems to be that gold was a barbaric relic perhaps in so far as it supported nation states, but was alright as the support for a supra-government supervised international currency of last resort. Well, the European Union is teaching us a lesson about supra-government international arrangements that we should heed before the chaos that Mr Rickards so calmly describes engulfs us all.

[At a later date, I will continue reviewing the whole of this illuminating book.]

Museum of Money, Bogota

There are several institutions throughout the world which are part of the historical numismatic memory  –  without which we could not enjoy the collections nor any interest in investing in those precious coins which safeguard our heritage in the way that gold coins do. Today therefore we will touch upon the history of Colombia’s Mint Museum.

For those passionate about numismatics travelling to Colombia and in particular to Bogota, there is one place not to be missed: the Mint Museum, located in the working-class district of La Candelaria.

Latin American countries have always had a very strong link to the history of gold – therefore we shall dedicate some space to them, sharing their history and an analysis of their coins, those which are most representative and much valued and appreciated by their inhabitants.

King Felipe III of Spain ordered the foundation of this emblematic Mint Museum in Santa Fé de Bogota and entrusted the works to the engineer Alonso Turrillo de Yebra.

First coins struck (BANREP)

The striking of coins began in 1621 in one of the very first buildings constructed in Bogota. The history of this Mint Museum is very important since it is the place where the first gold coins of the Americas were manufactured, the “macuquinas”, which were named ‘doubloons or mintings’.

Some were struck in Cartagena and others in Santa Fé de Bogota. It was only a decade or so later that the striking of gold coins was authorized in the Mint Museums of Mexico and Peru.

Its infrastructure improved gradually, going from a small, simple blacksmith’s workshop located on only one level at the current Museum, endowed with a beautiful Andalusian-style architecture with a touch of provincial colonial period features.

Santa Fé de Bogota was the capital of the Spanish Vice-royalty of New-Grenada, home to the viceroys, the judges of the Royal Court, the Clergy, the Captains of the Tercios of Spain and of course to Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, its founder.

The amount of work becoming increasingly important in terms of volume, the directors of the museum found themselves under increasing pressure over time to reform it in order to meet requirements. Half a century after its inauguration, it was Felipe VI himself who ordered its expansion – in the beginning, the striking was highly traditional, but following the implementation of various changes, machines started to be used.

Their treasures were much coveted during the riots which took place in the Colombian capital, but they fortunately survived all attacks – including natural ones, notably during earthquakes.

Nowadays, we can enjoy the same museum as that of several centuries ago, which was re-inaugurated by Viceroy Solis in 1756.

Bogata’s Mint Museum is recognized as a National Monument, a title which was granted in 1975 following the decree of 1584, currently dependent upon the Bank of the Republic of Colombia.

Within, one can follow all the most important events of the country’s history, the history of the museum and all the coins and notes manufactured throughout these centuries.

Taxation in the modern state is an attack on wealth and its creation.

Which is illogical, because without wealth creation there can be no tax base.

The Welfare State was founded, and is foundering, on conundrums such as these. So perhaps it is not surprising to see a Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer engaging in what amounts to left-wing style class warfare.

George Osborne has just announced that he is “going after the wealthy tax dodgers”. As reported in The Daily Telegraph, Tuesday 10th April, he has been examining “anonymised” tax returns furnished by HM Revenue and Customs which show the completely legal measures that some very rich people have been using to reduce their tax bills, through what the Chancellor and the Revenue are pleased to call “loopholes”.

If the measures are legal, how can those who use them be called “dodgers”? (And see here for another example of the Revenue being rude.)

Osborne has cleverly turned the issue into a moral one and in doing so has introduced a novel legal concept on the hoof. These schemes of tax avoidance have been dubbed “aggressive” avoidance, as if by hurling an adjective about what is legal is suddenly rendered “un”-legal.

Now one of these legal “loopholes” is offsetting tax liabilities by making donations to charity, which in the nature of things would be large ones for the offset to work. Closing this “loophole” is therefore going to deprive flourishing charitable organisations of substantial and necessary sums.

Now one of these legal “loopholes” is offsetting tax liabilities by making donations to charity, which in the nature of things would be large ones for the offset to work. Closing this “loophole” is therefore going to deprive flourishing charitable organisations of substantial and necessary sums.

And it is to be observed that such charities find more efficient and targeted ways of spending the money they receive through such donations. Can the government be expected, can the government even promise, to spend the money that it thus intends to steal as efficiently? Of course not.

One obvious practical problem that also looms is that many of these allegedly “aggressive avoiders” are foreigners, who settled here because of the way the tax rules had already been drawn up: they run businesses, they spend – in other words, they are already “contributors” in various ways to the economic life of the country. If the rules that encouraged them to settle here are changed, then they will simply leave, or if they stay, the taxes imposed on them will dry up certain expenditures, which will amount to much the same as if they had departed.

So the plans to deal with people who have done nothing illegal will have the opposite effect: less wealth creation, less voluntary “distribution” through getting and spending of that created wealth through the rest of the economy and more government waste – of human resources as well as cash…

Once upon a time, these things were done so differently: here is the opening paragraph of A. J. P. Taylor’s volume in the Oxford History of England, “English History 1914-1915”:

Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country for ever without a passport or any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other currency without any restriction or limit. He could buy goods from any country in the world on the same terms as he bought goods at home. For that matter, a foreigner could spend his life in this country without permit and without informing the police. Unlike the countries of the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to perform military service. An Englishman could enlist, if he chose, in the regular army, the navy, or the territorials. He could also ignore, if he chose, the demands of national defence. Substantial householders were occasionally called on for jury service. Otherwise, only those helped the state who wished to do so. The Englishman paid taxes on a modest scale: nearly £200 million in 1913-1914, or rather less than 8 per cent. of national income.

By Mark Rogers

For all practical purposes, it has looked for a very long time as if the gold standard has become a curiosity; reviled by Keynesians, found impractical by politicians (I wonder why?!), alleged to be unworkable as a medium for regulating international trade – these are just some of the reasons that anybody who advocates a possible return to it is regarded as a crank. (This does not stop governments from wanting to get their hands on gold or control it, as witness the buying of gold in China, and the curtailing of paying for gold in cash in Europe.)

That is not the only reason why I am, at least for the purposes of this article, putting the gold standard in the category of a curiosity. Although Britain came off the gold standard in 1931, at least as late as 1934 candidates sitting the Final Examination of the Institute of Chartered Accountants were still being asked questions on the gold standard.

I discovered this in a small crib published in 1934 for such candidates: “109 Examination Questions on General Financial Knowledge together with Answers Thereto” by R. Byrne (A.C.A, A.S.A.A., F.C.I.S), published by The Coaching Association Ltd, London E.C.2.

Here they are, giving as good and succinct a definition as one could wish for, written with essentially practical business in mind:

Q.77 Explain concisely what is meant by the gold standard, and mention the various forms of the gold standard.

By “the gold standard” is meant a system of monetary management whereby the currency of the country has a definite gold value, even though the circulating medium is a paper currency or a metal other than gold.

Any country which is on the gold standard undertakes that its standard coin shall contain a fixed and unalterable amount of pure gold. It also undertakes that such standard gold coins shall be legal tender to an unlimited amount, and that its central agent (the Bank of England in this country) shall buy and sell gold at certain fixed prices.

Under the gold specie or circulation standard – which is the most perfect form of gold standard – gold coins are actually in circulation and the central bank undertakes to redeem any of its bank notes in gold coin. Gold coin, therefore, is readily available for the settlement of debt. This is the system which was in operation in this country prior to 1914. The gold bullion standard, which was in operation in this country from 1925 until 1931, is a more restricted form of gold standard. Under this system the central bank is bound to buy and sell gold bullion at fixed prices. In England, the Bank of England was compelled to buy gold of standard fineness at the rate of £3 17s. 9d. per oz., and to sell it – in bars of not less than 400 ozs. – at £3 17s. 10½d. Consequently, gold was always available for shipment in payment of debts, and the £ always had a value fixed in relation to these prices. The gold exchange standard is that adopted by silver-using countries. Thus, a country such as India would maintain the gold standard by purchasing the exchange or securities of a country which was on the gold standard, e.g. England. These securities could be sold, and with the proceeds gold obtained from the Bank of England. This gold could then be transferred to India’s creditors so that the rupee, although silver, could be definitely linked to gold.

Q.78 Explain how the gold standard operates to adjust the balance of international trade.

The gold standard maintains stability of the exchanges, for when the currency of a gold standard country is convertible into gold at a fixed price, the value of that currency in terms of the currencies of other gold standard countries will only vary within small limits known as specie points. Therefore, international trade may proceed without any fear on the part of the trader of loss owing to exchange fluctuations.

In order that the gold standard shall operate freely, it is necessary that no restrictions shall be placed upon the free movement of gold from centre to centre, and that there should be some relationship between the internal and external purchasing power of a currency.

When a country has an adverse balance, payment will be made in the form of gold. The loss of gold will result in a contraction in the volume of money, and prices will tend to fall. In consequence, the country exporting gold is able to produce more cheaply, and its exports tend to increase. Its imports, however, tend to decrease because of the higher costs of production prevailing abroad. In the countries receiving the gold the opposite results will be noticed, i.e. more imports and fewer exports, so that in due course the country which had the unfavourable balance will tend towards equality with the others, and will ultimately have a favourable balance, resulting in the receipt of gold.

The gold standard therefore operates as a corrective, whereby the course of international trade is facilitated by the transfer of gold.

If the gold standard is not permitted to operate freely, i.e. by an inflationary policy on the part of the gold-losing country, or by excessive tariffs on the part of others, gold will tend to move one way only, resulting in the exhaustion of gold supplies of at least one country, and the eventual abandonment of the gold standard by that country.

For good measure, Q.79 is What are the disadvantages of a paper standard of currency? the last sentence of the answer reading emphatically: It may be remarked that inflation has always occurred in cases where a paper standard has been adopted.

[The author is, amongst other things, a dealer in secondhand books and is always picking up little gems such as this crib on his rambles!]

(Adapted from Cochran, Robert, The Romance of Industry and Invention, W.&R. Chambers, London, no date, but clues in the text imply 1895)

“The railway journey from Capetown to Johannesburg of almost three days is through a seemingly endless sandy country, with range succeeding range of distant mountains, all alike, and strikes a greater sense of vastness and desolation than an expanse of naked ocean itself. Well, we reach Johannesburg, which has not even yet, with all its wealth, a covered-in railway station; whilst by way of contrast, just across the road is a huge club, with tennis, cricket, football, and cycling grounds, gymnasium, military band, halls for dancing, operas, and oratorios, &c., which will bear comparison with any you please. Its members are millionaires and clerks, lodgers and their lodging-house keepers, all equal there; for we have left behind caste, cliques, and cathedral cities, and are cosmopolitan, or, in a word, colonial. An institution like this gives us the state of society there in a nutshell, for, as wages are very high, any one in anything like lucrative employment can belong to it; and the grades in society are determined by money, and money only.

“Johannesburg, the London of South Africa, which was a barren veldt previous to 1886, is now the centre of some one hundred thousand inhabitants, and increasing about as fast as bricks and mortar can be obtained. It is situated directly on top of the gold, and on looking down from the high ground above, it looks to the English eye like a huge, long-drawn-out mass of tin sheds, with its painted iron mine-chimneys running in a straight line all along the quartz gold-reef as far as you can see in either direction. The largest or main reef runs for thirty miles uninterruptedly, gold-bearing and honeycombed with mines throughout. This, even it were alone, could speak for the stability and continued prosperity of the Transvaal gold trade. In a mail-steamer arriving from the Cape there is sometimes as much as between £300,000 and £400,000 worth of gold, and the newspapers show that usually about £100,000 worth is consigned by each mail-boat.

“It was one Sunday evening in 1886 that the great ‘find’ was made which laid the base of the prosperity of the Johannesburg-to-be. A farm-servant of the brothers Struben went over to visit a friend at a neighbouring farm, and as he trekked homeward in the evening, he knocked off a bit of rock, the appearance of which led him to take it home to his employer. It corresponded with what Struben had himself found in another part, and following up both leads, revealed what became famous as the Main Reef, which was traced for miles east and west.

“With this discovery the name and fame of ‘the Rand’ were established, and for years the district became the happy hunting ground of the financiers and company promoters. The Rand, or Witwatersrand, is the topmost plateau of the High Veldt of the Transvaal, and on the summit of the plateau is the gold-city of Johannesburg.

“Soon the principal feature in Johannesburg was the Stock Exchange, and the main occupation of the inhabitants was the buying and selling of shares in mining companies, many of them bogus, at fabulous prices. Today the city is the centre of a great mining industry, and the roar of the ‘stamps’ is heard all round it, night and day. From a haunt of gamblers and ‘wild-catters’, it has grown into a comparatively sedate town of industry, commerce and finance, and the gold-fever which maddened its populace has been transferred (not wholly, perhaps) to London and Paris.

“The Stock Exchange of Johannesburg sprang into existence in 1887, and before the end of that year some sixty-eight mining companies were on its list, with an aggregate nominal capital of £3,000,000.

“In 1887 the Transvaal produced only about 25,000 ounces of gold; in 1894 the output was 2,024,159 ounces; in 1895 it was 2,277,633 ounces.

“As to the future of the South African sources of supply, it is estimated by Messrs Hatch and Chalmers, mining engineers, who have published an exhaustive work on the subject, that before the end of the century the Witwatersrand mines alone will be yielding gold to the value of £20,000,000 annually; that early next century they will turn out £26,000,000 annually; and that the known resources of the district are equal to a total production within the next half century of £700,000,000, of which, probably, £200,000,000 will be clear profit over the cost of mining.”

The Federal Reserve’s holdings of gold are not only non-existent, contrary to what many people understand, they do not even amount to paper gold.

In 1933, the first year of his presidency, President Roosevelt ordered the seizure of private holdings of gold (with some exceptions for jewellery and dentistry); this was followed in 1934 by the confiscation of gold from the banks. This was allegedly in response to the shortage of gold caused by the great depression.

In 1934 the United States fixed the dollar price of gold at $35/troy ounce (devaluing the dollar thereby). This became known as the “statutory” or “legal” price. In spite of all that subsequently happened, the U.S. refused to consider an increase in this price of gold, not the establishment of the Bretton Woods agreement and the International Monetary Fund, nor the devaluation of the pound sterling in 1949 which in effect raised the price of gold in the sterling area without a rise in its price in the dollar area.

In the 1950s the volume and value of the world trade in gold kept on increasing, leading to the idea that a universal rise in the price of gold could be brought about by its dollar revaluation. The growth of the world’s monetary gold reserves as then valued fell far below the increase in the current volume/value; thus, it became clear that the annual yield of new gold (at the same valuation) could not express the increasing volume of goods produced. The U.S. gold reserves had by now fallen to well below the level at which they guaranteed paper money. Nonetheless the U.S. price of gold remained the same.

Decoupling the dollar from gold

In 1972 the “statutory” price was adjusted to $38/ounce and again in 1973 to $42.22/ounce. These movements were followed in 1975 by the revocation of the prohibition on ownership of gold by private parties.

Amongst the banks that had had its gold reserves confiscated was the Federal Reserve – the Treasury was the authority which performed the confiscation. The fact that the Federal Reserve is quasi-independent of the government (somewhat analogously to the Bank of England before it was nationalized in 1946), explains the apparent anomaly of the state confiscating its own reserves.

The Federal Reserve was obliged to sell its gold to the Treasury at $20.67/oz, in return for which it received gold certificates worth around $3.617 billion.

So why does the idea persist that the Federal Reserve has any gold reserves at all? Because the deal done with the Treasury issued in those certificates just mentioned, which is why the Federal Reserve lists them, as the “Gold certificate account”, in its accounts, consistently valued at the final price of 1973.

The Fed’s “paper gold” not even paper gold

Dr Ron Paul, member of the House of Representatives, is the champion of getting the Federal Reserve to be audited by the Government Accountability Office: that task has always been undertaken by the Federal Reserve itself (surprising as that may seem). Hitherto his efforts at getting this into law have met huge resistance and evasion by the Federal Reserve (which is not surprising at all).

On the first of June, 2011, testimony by Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, and Thomas C. Baxter Jr., General Counsel, Federal Reserve (formal testimony here) before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., of which Dr Paul was the Chairman, on Federal Reserve Lending Disclosures, exposed the nature of the “gold certificate account” in exchanges between Dr Paul and Mr Alvarez.

Crucially, it transpires that these certificates are not even claims to the actual gold that the Treasury confiscated. Said Mr Alvarez: “No we have no interest in the gold that is owned by the Treasury. We have simply an accounting document that is called gold certificates that represents the value at a statutory rate that we gave to the Treasury in 1934.″

In a fascinating analysis of this extraordinary statement, GoldNews.Com discusses what this means in terms of the relationship between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve: “The Treasury, however, in a desire to realize the value of the gold without selling it, used their gold as collateral against gold certificate issuance to the Fed in exchange for fresh cash for the Treasury to spend. The Treasury is able to print as many gold certificates as they choose, under one restriction from the Gold Reserve Act: the amount of gold certificates outstanding shall at no time exceed the value of gold held by the Treasury, priced at the statutory rate. This meant any increase in the value of the Treasury’s gold could be matched by printing gold certificates and those certificates could be used to acquire new Federal Reserve Notes (dollars) from the Fed.”

This is Quantitative Easing with a vengeance! In order to have more money to spend, the Fed is asked to print more notes, in return for which, and in order, presumably, not to disturb the “statutory” price recorded on the Fed’s accounts, the Treasury then prints more gold certificates.

An upshot of this is that the dollar is worth a good deal less than is assumed. And a corollary of this is that the manner in which the Treasury acquired the gold and its subsequent valuation as “gold certificates” would explain why, as noted above, the U.S. insisted on maintaining the dollar price at $35 for so long: it was an accountancy exercise and no more, and continues as such to this day.

Does this, at least in theory, mean that should there ever be a deal whereby the Fed buys its gold back from the Treasury, it would do so at that “price” on its books?

The analysis of this extremely complicated state of affairs by GoldNews.Com can be found here (Part One) and here (Part Two, from which the substantial quotation above has been taken).

Credit no measure of true value

Here, in the light of the above discussion, is a sobering observation made by C.H.V. Sutherland, then Keeper of Coins at the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, in “Gold: Its Beauty, Power and Allure” (published by Thames and Hudson, 1969): “Collapse of the gold standard was followed by the era of credit currency. We accept a bank-note for the payment of £1, but in accepting it we receive in fact only the bank’s promise to pay £1. We accept a cheque, similarly; but a cheque again is no more than its drawer’s promise that his bank will pay us another bank’s promises. The growth of ‘money’ in this sense – and of course it is not money at all, in any true sense, but an extension of credit – is one of the most remarkable features of economic life since 1914 [emphasis added].”

There is considerable historical irony in the fact that President Roosevelt ended Prohibition in 1933, only to enact another prohibition on the private ownership of gold, with consequences which are still unravelling in the “current” financial crisis: I say “current” because the problems of paper money have been unravelling ever since the decisions about gold related above were taken – just as the same President’s New Deal, with its state-backed savings and loans funds, is a fundamental cause of the subprime crisis.

Nothwithstanding such follies of prediction, I am going to announce the Barmiest Political Story of the Year. And no, it is not the euro-shenanigans…

It was reported in The Sunday Telegraph, 5 January 2012, that last year the Indian Government tried to reject Great Britain’s development aid largesse. The U.K. Department for International Development has spent in excess of £1 billion over the last five years in “aid” to India, with a further £600 million earmarked up to 2015, corresponding to about £280 million per year.

This in spite of the fact that “the then Foreign Minister, Nirupama Rao, proposed ‘not to avail [of] any further DFID assistance with effect from April 1, 2011’.” In tune with the April folly, the British government declined the saving offered by India, officially now ranked as a middle-income country.

And what was the reason?

To save politicians’ faces. “They said”, continues The Sunday Telegraph correspondent Andrew Gilligan, quoting an anonymous source, “British Ministers had spent political capital justifying the aid to their electorate. … They said it would be highly embarrassing if the Government of India then pulled the plug.” Highly embarrassing? Wasting taxpayers’ money, when the recipient has declined it? Which is stupider: looking foolish because the DFID has ignored the tremendous growth in Indian prosperity? (And at an annual growth rate of 10%, that’s growing! Within the decade, the Indian growth rate is projected to be greater than Britain’s.) Or looking foolish because it is determined to persist in an unnecessary and demeaning expenditure, especially in these would-be austere times?

The Indian Government regards the aid as belittling, as if India was still being regarded as an impoverished country. Said the Finance Minister, Pranab Mukherjee: “We do not require the aid. It is a peanut in our total development exercises.”

This is a land where even the peasants invest in gold: “The IMF estimates in fact that Indian homes alone represent 15,000 tons of gold,” notes Jean-François Faure in “Gold: an investment and an insurance that reassures” (transalation). And here at GoldCoin.org we reported on January 14, 2011 that “India is responsible for one quarter of the global imports of gold.”
Gold is immensely important in India, even for the poorest families because it represents some sort of status; this is because gold jewellery plays an essential role in Indian marriage customs and ceremonies. It is a measure of both prudence and munificence. The U.K., the government of which has long since forgotten the first of these, and then makes a pretence of the latter, has no business being spendthrift with money it really hasn’t got.

Savings, anyone?

by Mark Rogers

Amadeo I of Savoy

Son of the Italian king Victor Emmanuel II, Amadeo I was proclaimed King of Spain on the 2nd of January, 1871. Hitherto, the influence exerted by the Spanish government sought to found a constitutional monarchy – hence they selected a foreign king and put in place a system of mandates, namely: the people for the king, through Parliament.
Amadeo I was the first king of Spain to be selected by Parliament. He was not recognised by certain parliamentarians, including; Carlists, Bourbons, the church and by the people; who judged him as being unpleasant and reticent towards learning the Spanish language.
Upon the death of General Prim, the political alliance which had placed Amadeo I on the throne began to dissolve little by little. The pressures brought by the federalist revolts, the loss of support from capitalists and the Carlists war pushed the Italian monarch to renounce the throne on the 11th of February, 1873.
From his 2 years of rule, hallmarks bearing his effigy were designed for the 5 Peseta coins as well as the 25 and 100 Peseta gold coins – some were struck as trials.
In 1868, a new parameter was integrated into the Spanish monetary system. Unique to the world, two dates were to be inscribed on the coins: the approval date of the coin type and when it was struck. Nevertheless, this initiative was not correctly followed between 1871 and 1875, partly covering the rule of Amadeo I. According to information collected in el Catálogo de la Peseta, it appears that the number of coins issued with the year (between the stars) 18-71 are more common than those of 18-73, those of 18-74 appear in only 20% of cases while those of 18-75 appear in only 10% of cases, approximately.
It was only during the 1st republic, i.e. not before the end of the year 1873 that the process of the two dates began to function better, inscribing the correct date between the stars of the coins.
But this accuracy of dating came at a time when the currency did not reflect reality since Amadeo I renounced the throne in February 1873. The republic followed and thereafter, in 1875, came the rule of Alfonso XII, although the currency with Amadeo I’s effigy continued to be struck until mid-1875.

Marks of guarantee of the Amadeo I coins

Five people were charged with assuming the guarantee of these coins. On the obverse side are affixed the first name and surname initials of the engraver – on the reverse, the surname initials of the two Testers and Beam Balancers:

Engraver: L.M.: Luis Marchionni

Testers and Beam Balancers:

SD M: Donato Álvarez Santullano, Eduardo Díaz Pimienta y Ángel Mendoza Ordóñez.

DE M: Eduardo Díaz Pimienta, Julio de Escosura Tablares y Ángel Mendoza Ordoñez.

25 Peseta gold coin

Amadeo I 25 Peseta coin

Characteristics:

Fineness: 900 Thousandths.

Diameter: 24mm.

Weight: 8.0645g.

Workshop: Madrid.

Edge of the first coins: Relief engraving of 27 six-ray stars, using the hoop system open to three points.

Edge of the coins struck later out of reddish gold: JUSTICIA Y LIBERTAD (JUSTICE AND FREEDOM) separated by three groups of two six-ray stars.

Obverse: AMADEO I REY DE ESPAÑA *1871* (AMADEO I KING Of SPAIN *1871*) - portrait of the king facing right.

Reverse: Ley 900 Milésimas (Title 900 thousandths) – 124 piezas in Kilog. (124 coins in Kilog.) SD 25 PESETAS M, around the Spanish armouries carrying the coat of arms of Savoy, surrounded by the coat and fleece.

Number of strikes: 1871 (75) SD M = 25

<The first strikes were made with an alloy containing 10% silver and conferred a bright yellow tone to the gold of these coins, which differentiates them from the other coins struck later, these latter ones displaying a more reddish tone of gold.

These coins, as well as the 100 Peseta coins of the same year were the first gold coins displaying a face value in Pesetas, emanating from the Reform of October 19^th 1868. Struck under the Order of the General Directorate of the Treasury of August 22^nd 1871, “as tests, and it is impossible to specify the quantity of coins manufactured in 71”>

(Information extracted from the Catálogo de la Peseta by J.Aledón & Modern World Gold Coins).

In general, the 25 Peseta coins began to be struck under the Royal Decree of March 15^th 1871. Previously, the reform of the Peseta did not integrate in the values struck out of gold the 25 Peseta coins, omitting the 8 gram model so well-known in Spain, Germany, Holland, etc…

Of these coins, only some were struck as tests. It is under the reign of Alfonso XII that they started to be manufactured in series.

100 Peseta gold coin

Amadeo I 100 Peseta coin

Characteristics:

Fineness: 900 Thousandths

Diameter: 35mm.

Weight: 32.25g.

Workshop: Madrid.

Edge: Relief engraving using the hoop system open to three points with the words JUSTICIA Y LIBERTAD (JUSTICE AND FREEDOM), separated by three groups of two six-ray stars.

Obverse: AMADEO I REY DE ESPAÑA *1871* (AMADEO I KING OF SPAIN *1871*) – portrait of the king facing right.

Reverse: Ley 900 Milésimas (Title 900 thousandths) – 31 piezas in Kilog. (31 coins in kilog.) SD 100 PESETAS M, around the Spanish armouries bearing the coat of arms of Savoy, surrounded by the coat and fleece.

Number of strikes in Yellow gold: 1871 (71) = 25

Number of strikes in Red gold: 1871 (71) = 50

> An auction was held in Madrid on March 16^th 1995, selling one of these coins at the starting price of 15 million pesetas (€ 90,151.82)

(Information extracted from Catálogo de la Peseta by J.Aledón & Modern World Gold Coins)

Re-striking of these coins

Unable to gain possession of the original specimens of the said coins, King Alfonso XIII commissioned the re-striking of specific ones in order to honour certain obligations. Thereafter, it was discovered that these coins appeared in 1963 coming from Switzerland.

The Decree of March 21^st 1871, which enacted the creation of the 25 Peseta gold coin, stipulated that it would contain any caption on the edge, and if possible that the smooth part of the corners would contain differences to distinguish these coins from those emanating from other countries.

But the coins re-struck out of reddish gold display on their edge: Justicia y Libertad (Justice and Freedom), separated by three groups of two six-ray stars, similar to the engraving on the edge of the 100 Peseta coins.

Thus, these two coins of reddish gold were a re-striking produced in an unofficial way with the original coins, and to purely profit-driven ends.

As these are very unusual and rare coins, to possess or decide to purchase some is a true luxury – a great treasure!

One of the consequences of the several waves of refugees from communist China (the revolution itself, the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s, the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s) was the rapid accumulation of informal dwellings on the mountainsides. These shacks were made out of anything handy: packing crates, corrugated iron, planks. They were incredibly hardy edifices: typhoons capable of lifting a battleship, blowing it out of the harbour and impaling it on a rocky island in the South China Seas, would leave the squatter huts crowded onto an exposed side of the island at the harbour mouth intact!
As a child I had always been fascinated by these places: they embodied escape, freedom, the mastering of adversity; they had an air of romance and adventure. Yet I had never visited one: this was something I remedied as I explored Hong Kong anew during 1975.

What I discovered was remarkable. First of all, these places were orderly and clean, the natural drainage of the mountainsides enabling the latter. The homes were sturdily constructed despite their flimsy materials. What was truly astonishing, however, was the discovery that the expensive cars parked at the foot of the hills belonged to the owners of these huts! This was not all: the informal lifestyle of the hillsides meant that the hut doors tended to be left open: there were always a few children or an ancient grandmother (whom we shall meet again) to keep an eye on things. Through these doors I glimpsed the good life inside: the huts had all the conveniences – fridges, deep freezes, television sets, electric fans, air conditioners, electric lighting: the hills were ablaze with electricity, all legally installed.

This lifestyle reflected a dominant desire among the Hong Kong Cantonese: the ambition, if not for themselves, then for their children to emigrate to one of the Anglosphere countries, far from China, which had caused them such grief. This being so, many prosperous people simply did not want to spend on property. The millionaire who lived on the hillside above us had built himself a house – it was in the style of a mansion, to accord with his status but was really very modest: what was the point of investing in substantial real estate when you might have to abandon it?

Portable Purchasing power?

The personal or family memory of enforced flight also gave rise to the idea that if you were going to have to pick up and go, then property should be portable. The wealthy of Hong Kong are unusual amongst the world’s richest in that they spend more of their money on jewellery and watches than any other type of investment and/or luxury good, mansions and yachts coming right at the bottom of their priorities – only a tiny percentage bother with these things. The desire for wealth in a safe and portable form surely means that the idea of putting their assets into gold coins would appeal to the wealthy, economy-stimulating entrepreneurs of Hong Kong.
Enter Grandma: while I was exploring the shacks and shanties, I saw the most revealing thing of all: the family wealth of these entrepreneurs was stored in gold – in Granny’s teeth: the fillings were so abundant that their mouths gleamed with gold!

by Mark Rogers

A decision that Greece will regret

Without a doubt this line of action will never save the Greek economy or start to rebuild some confidence for a decent future. Greece will stay in Debt for generations. The Greek people will never accept this and their strong protests are understandable. Headlines talk of a possible Greek default – Why? Greece has been bankrupt for over a year, since it first asked for a “bailout”.

The only route to recovery is to restructure the debts or simply declare the country bankrupt. This would be the best solution for the Greeks but of course they’re in a weak position and all recent decisions, including the political waffle and rhetoric, have been taken to secure the European banks that are hugely exposed to the Greek debt. Be under no illusion that the only reason for this action is to appease the power brokers that support the European Governments. The politicians including the Greek government don’t care one iota for the regular people of Greece and why would they because they are all sufficiently immune to the deepening crisis because their deep pockets are lined with personal wealth that removes them from harm’s way and any sense of reality or empathy with those suffering the effects.

The people’s retribution

The one way Greek people have of preserving and protecting their personal wealth is to opt out of the normal system and there is evidence that they have started to empty their bank accounts (maybe à la Cantona – see Eric Cantona’s French Revolution).
Firstly they are taking retribution on the Banks by weakening them and also showing their distrust for reckless, uncaring institutions.
Secondly they are storing their wealth in something tangible and much more reliable than invented currency which could devalue or collapse anytime – they are buying gold coins as they did during the Second World War because they know that this will maintain real value and purchasing power through the difficulties ahead.
Here is some evidence provided recently in the Financial Times by Kerin Hope

ATHENS — Greek citizens are emptying savings accounts and buying gold as they brace themselves for the possibility of a sovereign default and a run on the banks.

Pledges by socialist Prime Minister George Papandreou that his government would “save the country” have been widely discounted by the public. However, parliament gave him a vote of confidence late on Tuesday night. The socialists have a six-seat majority in the 300-member house.

Sales of gold coins have soared as savers seek a safer and fungible source of value.

“When the global financial crisis started, our sales of coins to investors overtook bullion for the first time,” said Harry Krinakis, at Sepheriades, a Greek precious metals trader. “Now the sales ratio has reached five to one.”

Tomas, a computer technician, has exchanged his euro savings for gold coins: “I keep them at home just like my grandmother did in the Second World War.”
Monthly bank withdrawals were running at E1.5 billion-E2 billion in the first quarter. Last year, depositors withdrew E30 billion, equivalent to 12.3 per cent of total savings, according to the central bank. Greek deposits worth an estimated E8 billion were transferred to banks in Cyprus in 2010. But the flow has dried up this year amid fears that Cypriot banks could suffer contagion.

Andreas, a supermarket manager, transferred the family savings to Munich earlier this year. “The Swiss banks aren’t interested unless you’ve got several hundred thousand euros,” he said.

“We can’t trust the politicians to get us out of this mess [and] have to protect our families,” said Sakis, a garage owner, at an anti-austerity protest in Athens’ Syntagma Square. “A bank collapse has got to be in the cards.” He added he had withdrawn his savings and placed them in a bank safe deposit box “for security. Who cares about interest right now?”

Others put their savings into land when prices fell after Greece’s first European Union-led rescue last year. Angelos, a software specialist, bought a neighbour’s olive grove. “I grabbed the opportunity,” he said.
“A year ago I wouldn’t have considered making such an old-fashioned investment.”

It is no accident that other European countries, particularly Germany and France, have experienced dramatically increased investment in gold coins during the last three months. In France investors own more gold than the Bank of France and transactions in coins have increased by 35% (source AuCoffre.com) since January. These countries have aan historical reference to gold coin investments and their benefits so it is no surprise to witness such an increase during periods of crisis. In fact one can determine the “temperature” of concern from this rising activity and people are seriously concerned about an impending crash on the horizon that will have global significance.

Countries like the UK are rather slow on the uptake and the gold investment market tends to be reserved for the extremely well-off and well-connected. What a shame so many people are misled by false information to detract them from participating or they are just ignorant of the facts.

Anyway their loss is someone else’s gain and come the day they will be left holding bits of paper good for burning while their European neighbours use their gold coins to pay for provisions and ultimately survival!

Remember that the signs of crisis were ignored by myopian political rhetoric pre-2008 leaving millions of ordinary folk open to its consequences. The signs of crisis have been with us ever since and still they pretend all will be well and their policies are “working”.

2008 was just the prelude and the worst is yet to arrive.
Be warned and be prepared or once again you will be hung out to dry!

An investment in gold is a survival kit for your future.