By Mark Rogers

Welfarism undermines democracy: this is one of the manifest lessons of the eurozone crisis, and is seen in many ways, the most recent being the Greek elections in the fissipiration of the political system, with the running being made by minority parties with unrealistic and self-aggrandizing agendas. Instead of there being any attempt at shrinking the state, more, and more aggressive, groupuscules want more of the same: “Syriza’s idealistic economic programme calls for providing students with free meals and doling out pensions equal to final salaries. Mr Tsipras says the state should hire 100,000 more workers to help reduce unemployment.” (The Economist, May 12th 2012). Is this “idealism” or ignorance (though the latter is, of course, the handmaid of the former)? After all one of the things that brought the Greeks to their knees was the number of people entitled to government largesse.

When the Greeks received the first bailout from the Germans, Papandreou publicly thanked the German government and people for their largesse and acknowledged that as a result the Greeks would have to do some serious cleaning up, starting with an attempt to find out how many people worked for the government. They didn’t know! This is welfarism with an insouciance.

Democracy and accountability

The idea that democracy is a device to hold government to account implies a responsible, independent citizenry and limited government. One of the things that the government is to be held accountable for is limitations on its growth. The welfare state, instead, thrives on factional interests which seek to carve out niches for themselves at the expense of others, with the state as overlord and facilitator – and therefore at the mercy of being captured by the bolder interest groups.

The Founding Fathers of the American Constitution wanted to strike the right balances between majorities and minorities, while recognizing both that majorities could become tyrannous and that minorities could descend into factionalism. The balances that the Founding Fathers sought were to prevent majorities from dealing with minorities in the old-fashioned European way – i.e. simply eliminating them, whether through exile or execution. This meant allowing minorities a functioning place within the body politic accommodating their ways where they were beneficial without creating vested interests which might put the public order at risk.

While it is self-evident that the Constitution of the U.S.A. has not prevented the growth of big government or the gradual assimilation of the American people to welfarism, it is also clear that modern government’s most serious derogation from constitutional principle is the emergence of the centralized state as a faction in itself. Large civil services become an end in themselves; the purveyors of welfare form a huge vested interest group, averse to change that may damage their own position however it may benefit the taxpayers who fund them.

While it is usual to equate freedom with democracy and welfarism with fairness, in fact there is no logical or historically necessary connection between freedom and democracy, nor is welfarism necessarily fair. In fact, the larger the state’s involvement in wealth distribution, whether it is by cash transfers, or manipulations of the educational and health systems, the more that the least admirable moral qualities are promoted in the welfare state: envy and greed.

Entitlement

The welfare state encourages the vice of entitlement, actively encouraged by the administrators of the welfare state – through education, through multiculturalism and through the benefits system. If bankers are thought to be too quick to justify their salaries, it is only done in the language of the welfare state which all are encouraged to use. (An aside on bankers: while, as has been maintained here, here and here,their remuneration is an utterly inadequate basis for the crisis, bankers at least operate in a world of more immediate accountability: recently shareholders have risen to the task of curbing pay in relation to poor performance.)

Envy in the East?

I grew up in Hong Kong (my political and economic gold standard). That there were exceptionally wealthy people was well-known, but they tended not to live celebrity lives and had risen to their riches, in many cases from extreme poverty, through hard work and good judgment. That everyone had a chance to better themselves to the extent that they were prepared to work for it because the tax system was simple and equitable, meant that envy was at a discount in Hong Kong – people tended rather to admire the rich because they were hard working and philanthropic, and because each and all had the opportunities open to them to advance to similar riches. A breeding ground for hard work, thrift and imaginative enterprise rather than envy, greed and carping.

By Mark Rogers

Needless to say, there is a great deal of concern about this story, first addressed on this site on Monday. Conspiracy theorists are in little doubt this is a government swindle, though leveller heads are pointing out that this is unlikely. Nevertheless, it has to be said that the Mint’s Media Statement is very cagey in what it says about the origin of the dud coins: the suspension of senior staff last December was because of “technical issues”, and the longer statement quoted in my last article doesn’t exactly link those “technical issues” to the dud proofs.

Nor does it link the criminal gang which stole R5 circulation coins to the minting scandal. While it is entirely understandable that the Mint does not want to debase the trust that any such institution must maintain and therefore does not want to say too much in case panic ensues, why, then, has it said anything at all?

The curator of modern money at the British Museum, Thomas Hockenhull, is quoted in The Washington Post, April 24, as saying that it is unusual for mints to go public on problems of this kind, while Tom Hallenbeck, the American Numismatic Association’s President is also quoted to the effect that glitches in manufacturing are to be expected given the volume of coins produced.

Exposed

An obvious reason for saying anything at all is damage limitation. Whatever is going on at the SA Mint was already under investigation by CNBC and Forbes, and with television exposure and Forbes publishing its findings next month, perhaps the Mint thought that its hand was being forced.

Undoubtedly, it has fallen between two stools as a result. The clarification that it had (somehow) produced under specification coins and not as TimesLive reported underweight ones, led at least one commentator to conclude that this was evidence of a deliberate skimming exercise by the Mint itself:  “A national mint producing investment grade gold coins for several months with debased gold is not accidental. Period.”

That, of course, still does not rule out infiltration by a criminal gang, but that having been said, that such a gang could get away with it apparently for so long says volumes about accountability and transparency in a major public institution.

Effect?

A claim is made here that dealers are buying Krugerrand bullion coins at a lower premium than usual, while raising the possibility that there will be a “flight” from the coin. Did it escape the mind of the author of the Mint’s statement that this might happen, and that if the proof Krugers fell under suspicion, the contagion might spread to the bullion coins?

Even the mere speculation by a writer with an “anonymous source” on an internet site might be enough, especially in the light of the generally gloomy picture of politics in South Africa.

All over the world, political elites are coming under fire: high taxation, monetary incompetence, the keeping of a self-serving distance from their electorates – general nannying while the ship of state flounders.

Even if the problems of the SA Mint were occasioned by such political incompetence, rather than a deliberate crime sanctioned at the highest level, the suspicion that is falling on governments everywhere is reason enough to seek safe havens elsewhere – indeed, they are vital as havens from the financial incontinence of the state.

Alternative

Whatever else is revealed, and happens in consequence, there is an alternative, again as mentioned on Monday: the Vera Valor. Not only is this coin of the highest standard of purity; not only is it audited to a high standard, and its source and manufacture of a high standard of purity; it also has another quality – it is a purely commercial venture, with no connections to malfunctioning government institutions and suspicious officials.

By Mark Rogers

Is there a necessary connection between gold coins and politics? The short answer is: yes. Undoubtedly over the course of the last century, and beginning fairly early on, gold became, and still remains, a highly controversial political subject. The most influential economist of the century, John Maynard Keynes disparaged not just the gold standard but the metal itself: he thought wealth creation a sort of secular sin, and considered those who saved to be selfish. In 1933, President Roosevelt banned the private ownership of gold, and passed measures to confiscate privately held gold – something that may be about to occur in places as widely diverse as the European Union, Turkey and Vietnam, with a suspicion that the same is afoot in China.

Not surprisingly, these animosities towards gold have gone in tandem with the creation and expansion of the Welfare State, the political entity that is utterly bankrupt and is the prime cause of the financial crisis.

So, yes indeed gold, whether in the form of collectable coins or other types of investment, is very political indeed, but not just because it is seen as a store of selfish wealth, or, as its enemies derisorily call it, “hoarding”.

Ray Vicker in The Realms of Gold (published by Robert Hale, London, 1975) makes this very important point:

“The deeper one gets into monetary matters, the more one realizes that the whole argument about gold’s monetary role, or its inability to perform it, involves fundamental emotional attitudes toward man and his environment.

“Not only technical monetary systems are at odds when the chrysophilites and the chrysophobes argue money. This is cash versus credit. Sound versus easy money. A balanced federal budget versus deficit spending. Rugged free enterprise versus government economic management. A black-and-gray world versus utopia. The belief in sinful man meeting the conviction that man is essentially good. The idea that progress only comes through individual gain clashing with the contention that communal efforts spell forward movement.”

Gold, therefore, is not only a measure of prudence, it is also the summation of the political arguments of the last century – and even a repository of some of the profoundest truths of human existence.

Those who invest in gold are, in the long run, realists, as the following account by Vicker of what happened in the 1960s and 70s makes clear:

“When sense and nonsense are being evaluated the chrysophobes must explain how come they erred so much in the 1960s when they were denigrating gold and claiming that it was on the way out. It was in the 1960s and early 1970s that the great monetary battles involving gold were fought, with few people in the United States realizing what was happening even after the dollar experienced two devaluations. Briefly, the dollar, which had been ‘as good as gold’ for so long, no longer was as good as a thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold. And many people were discovering this fact.

“These people were termed ‘speculators’ through the monetary cyclones which erupted. Actually, they were ordinary businessmen, bankers and others who had sense enough to protect their assets. In politics, whenever anyone disrupts a pet project of the party in power, it is customary to tack some derogatory term onto the disrupters. The word ‘speculator’ has enough of an unsavoury connotation that it appealed to those in government who saw themselves as ‘defenders of the dollar’, though they couldn’t see the easiest method of preserving the whole system – a doubling of the monetary price of gold.”

Therefore, however unlikely it may seem on the surface that a numismatic website should feature regular political commentary, the central role that gold plays in human affairs means that its political and economic aspects need constant analysis.

An occasional series of curiosities of Gold, its history and ideas about it.

By Mark Rogers

For all practical purposes, it has looked for a very long time as if the gold standard has become a curiosity; reviled by Keynesians, found impractical by politicians (I wonder why?!), alleged to be unworkable as a medium for regulating international trade – these are just some of the reasons that anybody who advocates a possible return to it is regarded as a crank. (This does not stop governments from wanting to get their hands on gold or control it, as witness the buying of gold in China, and the curtailing of paying for gold in cash in Europe.)

That is not the only reason why I am, at least for the purposes of this article, putting the gold standard in the category of a curiosity. Although Britain came off the gold standard in 1931, at least as late as 1934 candidates sitting the Final Examination of the Institute of Chartered Accountants were still being asked questions on the gold standard.

I discovered this in a small crib published in 1934 for such candidates: “109 Examination Questions on General Financial Knowledge together with Answers Thereto” by R. Byrne (A.C.A, A.S.A.A., F.C.I.S), published by The Coaching Association Ltd, London E.C.2.

Here they are, giving as good and succinct a definition as one could wish for, written with essentially practical business in mind:

Q.77 Explain concisely what is meant by the gold standard, and mention the various forms of the gold standard.

By “the gold standard” is meant a system of monetary management whereby the currency of the country has a definite gold value, even though the circulating medium is a paper currency or a metal other than gold.

Any country which is on the gold standard undertakes that its standard coin shall contain a fixed and unalterable amount of pure gold. It also undertakes that such standard gold coins shall be legal tender to an unlimited amount, and that its central agent (the Bank of England in this country) shall buy and sell gold at certain fixed prices.

Under the gold specie or circulation standard – which is the most perfect form of gold standard – gold coins are actually in circulation and the central bank undertakes to redeem any of its bank notes in gold coin. Gold coin, therefore, is readily available for the settlement of debt. This is the system which was in operation in this country prior to 1914. The gold bullion standard, which was in operation in this country from 1925 until 1931, is a more restricted form of gold standard. Under this system the central bank is bound to buy and sell gold bullion at fixed prices. In England, the Bank of England was compelled to buy gold of standard fineness at the rate of £3 17s. 9d. per oz., and to sell it – in bars of not less than 400 ozs. – at £3 17s. 10½d. Consequently, gold was always available for shipment in payment of debts, and the £ always had a value fixed in relation to these prices. The gold exchange standard is that adopted by silver-using countries. Thus, a country such as India would maintain the gold standard by purchasing the exchange or securities of a country which was on the gold standard, e.g. England. These securities could be sold, and with the proceeds gold obtained from the Bank of England. This gold could then be transferred to India’s creditors so that the rupee, although silver, could be definitely linked to gold.

Q.78 Explain how the gold standard operates to adjust the balance of international trade.

The gold standard maintains stability of the exchanges, for when the currency of a gold standard country is convertible into gold at a fixed price, the value of that currency in terms of the currencies of other gold standard countries will only vary within small limits known as specie points. Therefore, international trade may proceed without any fear on the part of the trader of loss owing to exchange fluctuations.

In order that the gold standard shall operate freely, it is necessary that no restrictions shall be placed upon the free movement of gold from centre to centre, and that there should be some relationship between the internal and external purchasing power of a currency.

When a country has an adverse balance, payment will be made in the form of gold. The loss of gold will result in a contraction in the volume of money, and prices will tend to fall. In consequence, the country exporting gold is able to produce more cheaply, and its exports tend to increase. Its imports, however, tend to decrease because of the higher costs of production prevailing abroad. In the countries receiving the gold the opposite results will be noticed, i.e. more imports and fewer exports, so that in due course the country which had the unfavourable balance will tend towards equality with the others, and will ultimately have a favourable balance, resulting in the receipt of gold.

The gold standard therefore operates as a corrective, whereby the course of international trade is facilitated by the transfer of gold.

If the gold standard is not permitted to operate freely, i.e. by an inflationary policy on the part of the gold-losing country, or by excessive tariffs on the part of others, gold will tend to move one way only, resulting in the exhaustion of gold supplies of at least one country, and the eventual abandonment of the gold standard by that country.

For good measure, Q.79 is What are the disadvantages of a paper standard of currency? the last sentence of the answer reading emphatically: It may be remarked that inflation has always occurred in cases where a paper standard has been adopted.

[The author is, amongst other things, a dealer in secondhand books and is always picking up little gems such as this crib on his rambles!]

By Simone Wapler (translated from an article originally published in France)

In the middle of a difficult economic situation, investors rush for gilt-edged securities, among them: gold. But watch-out for the swindlers… do not confuse actual stocks with virtual stocks.

Everyone is talking about gold at the moment, especially as it is falling. Those who believe in a gold bubble are licking their lips. These bears are primarily to be found in the world of the big money men, the people who explain to you that your money must be made to “work”… in their own interest, clearly, just like Goldman Sachs. A recent survey carried out in France by the IFOP for the company AuCoffre.com produced surprising results. This particular French company is on the way to becoming the leading French company selling gold coins online. According to this survey, 68% of French people believe that gold is an investment with a future, but 60% find that it is incomprehensible and reserved to a privileged audience.

Some people who recently tried to buy gold through their banks found that it was not easy. Banks prefer to put forward their own certificates, or trackers, that are supposed to respond to the price of gold, rather than sell physical gold.  At first sight, if people want gold it is because they think that it will go up. Which is completely untrue. It is not gold that rises but currencies that drop. Here is the rise in the price of gold in the main currencies over the last 10 years:

• Peso 694%
• Rupee 487%
• US$ 474%
• Rouble 443%
• Pound Sterling 421%
• Real 339%
• Euro 287%
• Yen 262%
• Rand 262%
• $CAD 258%
• Francs 219%
• AU 186%

It is obvious that with the help of the crisis and the restarting of dubious monetary transactions, currencies continue to lose ground to gold and therefore its rise (since it is the commonly used term) continues. It is because currencies fall, with the dollar in the lead, that the central banks of the emerging country buy gold to diversify their reserves.

Who are the people holding gold for investment?

Out of the 166,000 tons of gold extracted from the ground, the central banks have 28,000 and private sector investment 30,000. Gold for investment is therefore to be found in the safe deposit boxes of the central banks, therefore the official sector, but also (and especially) in the private sector and in this case in two forms: in a shared form with the ETC (Exchange Traded Commodities) and in a private form for individuals. The ETCs are continuously listed certificates, in theory guaranteed by a physical gold reserve. Private individuals may also choose to obtain gold through their bank, and store it in their bank. In this case gold appears simply as one line on the bank account statement (1 ingot with a value of €40,000) and the bank stores it. Benefits: reduced management fees (since they are shared with others) and the safety of the large deposit-box of your bank.

But the real question is “does everyone actually have the gold that they claim to have”?

Why does the Fed refuse to have its reserves audited?

Our eyes are immediately focussed on the Fed, its colossal balance sheet of bad debts and its gold reserves. The Republican Senator Ron Paul has been asking for years for an audit on the gold reserves. In vain. [And see here for an analysis of this problem.] Just to stir up more problems, false ingots lined with tungsten have been discovered. They would appear to be of American origin.

Why do the central banks loan out their gold?

During the double decade (1980-2000) and the flat-period in the gold market, central banks engaged in the regrettable practice of giving gold out on loan in order to get some income from this dormant stock-pile. They can loan it out to commercial banks which use it to satisfy demand from an institutional client, for example. The last report on these strange practices goes back to 2006 and emanates from a private player, the specialized trader Blanchard. One then has to ask the question: do the ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds) ETCs actually possess their gold?

There exist various legal arrangements according to country. The following question is often repeated: wouldn’t these reserves not just be gold out on loan?

When banks give gold in exchange is it their own or your own?

In February 2011, The Wall Street Journal informed us that gold is accepted in the swaps transactions of commercial banks.  At this date, the inter-banking market is completely seized up. Banks are terrified and refuse to lend between themselves. Where does this gold, that suddenly appears, come from? Is this gold out on loan by central banks or is this the famous gold in the pipeline of the customer? Deafening silence.

Comex sets the price of gold… paper gold. The largest futures market in the world remains Comex. A futures contract is a bit of paper which bears an expiry date, a commodity, a quantity and a price. At the expiry date, the owner of the bit of paper has a choice: to take delivery at the agreed price of the commodity or “roll-over his position”, i.e. take the following contract. The majority of speculators choose the latter. In the warehouses of Comex, there is therefore much less gold than that which is covered by the futures contracts which circulate. So much less that the Canadians (who are large gold producers) got annoyed: Comex sets its prices, disconnected from reality, on paper. Short sellers are financed by the lobby of the large US banks and everything is distorted, they claimed.

A revolt was organized in 2008 Vaporize Comex (Let’s smash Comex). Principle: that the holders of futures contracts ask for delivery, in unison, all on the same date to show to the face of the world that the warehouses of the Commodities Exchange were almost empty. The Canadian rebels had agreed on a contract at the end of December. Shortly after, rumours circulated according to which certain contract holders had agreed not to take delivery in exchange for substantial compensation in dollars…

 And that’s why the premium goes up!

 Simone Wapler is Chief Editor for Agora Publications (financial analysis and consultancy).

Source: Reuters

A lucid analysis from France on the logic of gold investment

Translated from an original article by Charles Sannat, Director of Economic Studies, AuCOFFRE.com, Paris

With regard to the economy, we have just gone through a “settlement” period with the Greek crisis. But in reality nothing has been settled. As far as Greece is concerned, we have gained a few months’ respite in so far as that country remains indebted to the tune of more than 120% of its GDP and nothing indicates that a recovery in the public finances can succeed. Having said that, we shall see within 12 to 24 months.

More worrying of course is the economic situation of Spain and Portugal, with here too monumental social damage in progress and popular demonstrations which are starting to become extremely significant in the fight against austerity plans. Beware. Spain is not Greece. Spain is a great country, with a great history and Franco’s nationalism only dates back to 1975, i.e. yesterday. As any expert on Spain will tell you, that country will never accept a Greek-style humiliation. The Prime Minister has in fact called a stop to certain reforms. And he is right-wing. Spain will not be able to find a way out of the economic, financial and property crisis with a strong euro which does not correspond to the intrinsic characteristics of its economy. The same applies to Portugal.

We should not forget our own country, France. If we recall, in 2010, there were 1.42 working people for every retired person. Retirements will end up by no longer being paid for because there is quite simply no more money. The problem is not in 20 years’ time. It is now.

France is also in bankruptcy. The Court of Auditors in France, chaired by the Socialist Migot, has stated that it is necessary to dispense with indexing pensions to inflation. With real inflation of 5% per annum, in 10 years’ time a pensioner will lose the equivalent of 60% of his purchasing power. That is the reality.

Lastly, let us remember the end is nigh atmosphere at the end of 2011 (that was three months ago). One really wondered whether the euro would have survived by Christmas. What has changed since then?  One simple but basic fact. Over-indebted countries (France and Germany) became even more indebted, to temporarily save a country like Greece from immediate bankruptcy. But it is the entirety of our economic system which is in an irremediably compromised position. Nobody is able to say so. Even less the “people” behind the system. That is self-evident.

The only truth is the following: infinite growth related to mass consumption thanks to abundant and cheap energy in a finite world is a system likely to fail.

• A gold purchaser does not buy gold to speculate.
• A gold purchaser does not buy gold to get rich.
• A gold purchaser does not have a view on the financial results of the next quarter.
• A gold purchaser buys gold because he or she has a fundamental analysis of the current dead end in which the global economy finds itself.
• He or she buys gold because each serious crisis ends up by finding a “monetary” resolution that is usually painful.
• He or she buys gold because gold has been the Vera Valor (true value) for more than 6,000 years whilst the euro barely celebrates its 10th anniversary.
• He or she buys gold because before 1914 the currency was gold; because in the inter-war years those who had given up gold got to know a period of hyperinflation which led to Nazism coming to power with the disastrous consequences that we all know.
• He or she buys gold because in 1971, the dollar was no longer convertible and only the banknote plate continued to function unsupervised.
• Above all, he or she buys gold because he or she knows, and it is a historical certainty, that nothing is immaterial. During the last century we saw five different international currency systems or one every 20 years on average.
• He or she buys gold because the current system will change. Regardless whether it is in six months or six years.
• Gold buyers buy gold because they know that whatever the outcome of change, they will have simply kept the value of their assets. And it is that which will make all the difference.

Everyone else is half-witted, rendered moronic through TV and lobotomized by the eternal Welfare State. They will suffer. But this last sentence should of course not be quoted. It is OFF the record as they say. And I will not even give a small coin (out of gold) to a tramp when he goes around begging with his small sign: “May I call upon your kindness, Ladies and Gentlemen, in helping a former paper salesman by giving a bit of change to eat and help me to remain clean.” These people are ruining French people, just as with the Russian loans, or the assignats, and with each devaluation… In short it is necessary to know history and fully understand that they do not support us. The people act as compensation for the rich (banks and the system).

That’s why gold is bought.

Gold is rising I am happy. Gold is falling I am equally happy because I can buy more.
A gold buyer is always happy:-)

By Mark Rogers

It is a universal truth that revolutions devour their children: this is ruefully acknowledged in the cases of the French and Bolshevik revolutions – considered “good” revolutions, as if Robespierre or Lenin were somehow accidents.

The revolution that is now unwinding with a vengeance is the Welfare State. It may seem overdoing it to call the Welfare State a revolution, but consider: it is normal to discuss the Welfare State in terms of safety nets, short-term solutions to modest problems like seasonal unemployment and housing for the poorest, or, in a more wide-ranging version of the arguments for it, as a necessary bulwark against economic catastrophes such as the Great Depression.

Yet the Welfare State itself devours so many resources and applies them without the constraints of market discipline, with the accompanying bloating of the civil service to administer it, that this in itself constitutes a revolution in economic and political habits. Add to this that as a result huge numbers of people have come to perceive government as a necessary arbiter of the way they live and the provider of their needs: this is an even bigger revolution.

For example, many people live in council flats and houses and survive on benefits including housing benefit. What the benefits system effectually does, in consequence, is to deprive people of any assets whatsoever, including themselves. That is, those who live entirely at the provision of the state do not exercise the assets they possess in hands and brains to carve out a living for themselves – it is not worthwhile to do so, as they are better off on benefits than working. This is a major reversal of those virtues that Keynes reviled (as we have noted here): industry, thrift, independence, a proper self-respect.

What this means is that the Welfare State is the chief driver of what we may call “de-development” in the western democracies. This takes two forms: the destruction of economic facts (see the discussion here) and the culture of dependence on government. Both have their origins in the misplaced desire to assist the poorest in society. The subprime crisis, for example, has its origins in FDR’s “New Deal” and the creation of the government-backed savings and loans “banks”. The massive growth of these institutions in itself became a problem, compounded by the Clinton administration’s drive to force lenders to lend to the poorest African Americans, under penalty of being convicted and fined for “racism” if they did not do so – ignoring the economic reality that no-one’s interests were served by deliberately creating debt in households that manifestly could not afford to repay it.

The bundling of “toxic debts” into securities that could then be traded was the banks’ and the markets’ ingenious but short-sighted nostrum to deal with one consequence of government intervention that had gone badly wrong. It may have kept western economies afloat a few years longer, this juggling act by the banks – but the policy behind it seems to have been somewhat Micawberish, waiting for something else to turn up…

And what has turned up is the massive bankruptcy of the Welfare State, nowhere more obviously epitomised than in the eurozone. Entirely driven by the manifest fact that the Welfare State is unaffordable, as is bluntly stated by those who know this – those who don’t, harp on about services being “underfunded”, as if unsustainable taxation only needed to become even more unsustainable and the problem would be solved!

As James Bartholomew points out in his crucial book “The Welfare State We’re In” it is only in the Welfare State that the poor are taxed – in ultra-capitalist Hong Kong the poor pay no taxes because the threshold on earnings before taxation kicks in is high, meaning that everyone has a chance to better themselves.

It should be more widely understood that bankruptcies are a sign of a healthy economy – stripping out ill-conceived or unworkable economic projects. This is the core of the eurozone crisis: what are we being told doesn’t work?

By Howard R. Gray, Guest Contributor

When Debt’s Called Credit (1), (2) and (3) looked at the follies of the modern mortgage. In the following piece, Howard R. Gray, Chartered Surveyor and Barrister at Law of Lincoln’s Inn and the Middle Temple, discusses the alternatives to foreclosure.

Why should mortgages be hostages to fortune?

The concept of a loan secured upon real estate has been a standard feature of our society: Common law systems have used real estate as a fundamental element of wealth. The engine of society must be production, distribution and sale of goods and services, and these need to be financed. Loans come in two main varieties, secured and unsecured; as would reasonably be expected, security is preferred and thus the mortgage provided the very best security for commercial transactions.

So what exactly is the mortgage? The dead pledge is that the real estate is held in a shell form by the home purchaser until the loan is paid, while ownership in real estate terms is recognized to be in the hands of the owner of the property. However, the truth is the mortgagee has the power in theory to reclaim his money should the mortgage payments fail to arrive on time. We’re used to the situation, though there have been very serious problems with the way mortgagees choose to bundle mortgages, treating them as negotiable securities. This has become such a problem in the U.S. that situations have arisen where mortgages are so muddled administratively that it is frequently impossible to know who has title to the income stream as mortgagee.

Foreclosure and Perpetual Institutions

Let me tell you what happened during one of my property cases many years ago. My client owned two properties in London, one in Camden Town and one further north towards Alexandra Palace. He was behind in his payments on the Camden property and found himself in court in foreclosure proceedings:  the usual method was to repossess the property, sell it cheap and recoup the difference, if possible, from the mortgagor.

I thought this innately unfair and frankly inequitable. I therefore broached the perpetual nature of banks: the mortgagee (a recently converted building society) took great umbrage at this idea. The question was simply: if a bank is a perpetual institution why is it selling property on the cheap when it could quite as easily hold onto it until the market turned as it always does, recoup the loan plus any ancillary expenses and, of course, hand back the difference to the mortgagor. Does this not appear to be a thoroughly equitable solution to a very unpleasant financial situation? The response was most alarming: defending counsel was spat upon by the solicitor for the bank!

Moral of the story

Banks generally are perpetual so long as they are properly managed. The truth is that banks being in the real estate business should be better equipped to be in that market during a recession or depression. Writing off loans, attacking mortgagors’ equities, often negative or thoroughly underwater during a recession, results in spectacular losses. Most mortgagees (the banks) ignore the benighted borrowers unless so large they threaten the bank’s viability: so why not immunize against such threats?

If Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had been disenfranchised from foreclosure in the first instance and had been made to stand back and look into the future and consider the possibility of managing underwater real estate, loans would have been factored to take that possibility into account. Given that recessions come and go and that banks are perpetual entities, by smoothing out repossessions over time very large elements of risk in real estate finance would disappear.

Since banks in any event hold onto properties in excess of 20 to 30 years why should they be shy of holding onto a property for three or four years to await a return to normality during a recession? While it is true that such a procedure might tie up funds, nevertheless a smoothing process which prevents a precipitous collapse in value through inimical short-term behaviour can only improve investment strategies for lender and borrower let alone the nation.

It would behoove the banking system to come up with this sort of arrangement rather than ask the government to do it for them. Now that gold and silver are becoming increasingly valuable it is high time to back up this process by ensuring some more rational security is built into the real estate market. By way of example, multigenerational mortgages exist in France, meaning that longer time horizons do not have to be a problem even for the shorter terms we are used to: this suggests that there are means of ensuring that foreclosure procedures could be smoothed out, as well as ensuring that the market waves are taken into account ab initio when the mortgage is granted.  

Money out of nothing – or gold?

Governments which overspend do not have a clue how to operate other than by creating money out of nothing or raising taxes. By having a mortgage market that can ride out economic waves there would be potential for underwriting the real economy as opposed to the fantasy economy of economically predatory governments. It won’t prevent government from fiscal irresponsibility but it might slow down the crash a while.

Introducing some form of gold valuation as an ancillary method of making real estate credible and tradable, should the currency collapse completely, ought to be carefully considered: this is a question of innovative contract design. Revaluing English real estate in the rental sector with regular rent reviews has, for example, been largely successful in dealing with inflation. If value is going to diminish significantly over time because of recession, why not make allowances for it and use some form of valuation based upon gold, coupled with foreclosure extension. This could be a short term method for the duration of a currency collapse.

Linking the value of real estate to gold through an underwriting formula is not an unreasonable proposition. Whatever the dollar or pound price of a good such as a Saville Row suit, pricing it in gold does not change much in the simple weight of gold. Real estate would work in the same manner: while for the most part the price of the real estate may go up or down, nevertheless, there would remain a component of the price that wouldn’t change much in real value over time, although it may change by significant amounts when measured in fiat currency terms.

Sustaining value

The simple conclusion is that banks are perpetual entities: they will be around after all the mortgagors have passed out of this world. It is not unreasonable to suggest that foreclosure should not entail the complete destruction of a loan contract. Given that recessions, depressions and booms are the norm in real estate as they are in the rest of the economy, nor should it be unreasonable to take account of this nature of the market by using a smoothing process to deal with a failure of the mortgagor to make his payments in full and on time. Since so many mortgagors have considerable equity in buildings this situation should have some form of protection in the loan recovery process. The market will develop ways to handle a creative process to allow a mortgagor to at least recover his investment just by allowing the market to turn back to an upward move in value.

By sustaining the value of buildings and preventing mortgagors from defaulting while awaiting a market turn coupled with creative processes to handle this there will be far fewer buildings coming onto the market in a distressed condition thus destroying overall building values during the pit of a depression.

By Mark Rogers

The Federal Reserve’s holdings of gold are not only non-existent, contrary to what many people understand, they do not even amount to paper gold.

In 1933, the first year of his presidency, President Roosevelt ordered the seizure of private holdings of gold (with some exceptions for jewellery and dentistry); this was followed in 1934 by the confiscation of gold from the banks. This was allegedly in response to the shortage of gold caused by the great depression.

In 1934 the United States fixed the dollar price of gold at $35/troy ounce (devaluing the dollar thereby). This became known as the “statutory” or “legal” price. In spite of all that subsequently happened, the U.S. refused to consider an increase in this price of gold, not the establishment of the Bretton Woods agreement and the International Monetary Fund, nor the devaluation of the pound sterling in 1949 which in effect raised the price of gold in the sterling area without a rise in its price in the dollar area.

In the 1950s the volume and value of the world trade in gold kept on increasing, leading to the idea that a universal rise in the price of gold could be brought about by its dollar revaluation. The growth of the world’s monetary gold reserves as then valued fell far below the increase in the current volume/value; thus, it became clear that the annual yield of new gold (at the same valuation) could not express the increasing volume of goods produced. The U.S. gold reserves had by now fallen to well below the level at which they guaranteed paper money. Nonetheless the U.S. price of gold remained the same.

Decoupling the dollar from gold

In 1972 the “statutory” price was adjusted to $38/ounce and again in 1973 to $42.22/ounce. These movements were followed in 1975 by the revocation of the prohibition on ownership of gold by private parties.

Amongst the banks that had had its gold reserves confiscated was the Federal Reserve – the Treasury was the authority which performed the confiscation. The fact that the Federal Reserve is quasi-independent of the government (somewhat analogously to the Bank of England before it was nationalized in 1946), explains the apparent anomaly of the state confiscating its own reserves.

The Federal Reserve was obliged to sell its gold to the Treasury at $20.67/oz, in return for which it received gold certificates worth around $3.617 billion.

So why does the idea persist that the Federal Reserve has any gold reserves at all? Because the deal done with the Treasury issued in those certificates just mentioned, which is why the Federal Reserve lists them, as the “Gold certificate account”, in its accounts, consistently valued at the final price of 1973.

The Fed’s “paper gold” not even paper gold

Dr Ron Paul, member of the House of Representatives, is the champion of getting the Federal Reserve to be audited by the Government Accountability Office: that task has always been undertaken by the Federal Reserve itself (surprising as that may seem). Hitherto his efforts at getting this into law have met huge resistance and evasion by the Federal Reserve (which is not surprising at all).

On the first of June, 2011, testimony by Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, and Thomas C. Baxter Jr., General Counsel, Federal Reserve (formal testimony here) before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., of which Dr Paul was the Chairman, on Federal Reserve Lending Disclosures, exposed the nature of the “gold certificate account” in exchanges between Dr Paul and Mr Alvarez.

Crucially, it transpires that these certificates are not even claims to the actual gold that the Treasury confiscated. Said Mr Alvarez: “No we have no interest in the gold that is owned by the Treasury. We have simply an accounting document that is called gold certificates that represents the value at a statutory rate that we gave to the Treasury in 1934.″

In a fascinating analysis of this extraordinary statement, GoldNews.Com discusses what this means in terms of the relationship between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve: “The Treasury, however, in a desire to realize the value of the gold without selling it, used their gold as collateral against gold certificate issuance to the Fed in exchange for fresh cash for the Treasury to spend. The Treasury is able to print as many gold certificates as they choose, under one restriction from the Gold Reserve Act: the amount of gold certificates outstanding shall at no time exceed the value of gold held by the Treasury, priced at the statutory rate. This meant any increase in the value of the Treasury’s gold could be matched by printing gold certificates and those certificates could be used to acquire new Federal Reserve Notes (dollars) from the Fed.”

This is Quantitative Easing with a vengeance! In order to have more money to spend, the Fed is asked to print more notes, in return for which, and in order, presumably, not to disturb the “statutory” price recorded on the Fed’s accounts, the Treasury then prints more gold certificates.

An upshot of this is that the dollar is worth a good deal less than is assumed. And a corollary of this is that the manner in which the Treasury acquired the gold and its subsequent valuation as “gold certificates” would explain why, as noted above, the U.S. insisted on maintaining the dollar price at $35 for so long: it was an accountancy exercise and no more, and continues as such to this day.

Does this, at least in theory, mean that should there ever be a deal whereby the Fed buys its gold back from the Treasury, it would do so at that “price” on its books?

The analysis of this extremely complicated state of affairs by GoldNews.Com can be found here (Part One) and here (Part Two, from which the substantial quotation above has been taken).

Credit no measure of true value

Here, in the light of the above discussion, is a sobering observation made by C.H.V. Sutherland, then Keeper of Coins at the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, in “Gold: Its Beauty, Power and Allure” (published by Thames and Hudson, 1969): “Collapse of the gold standard was followed by the era of credit currency. We accept a bank-note for the payment of £1, but in accepting it we receive in fact only the bank’s promise to pay £1. We accept a cheque, similarly; but a cheque again is no more than its drawer’s promise that his bank will pay us another bank’s promises. The growth of ‘money’ in this sense – and of course it is not money at all, in any true sense, but an extension of credit – is one of the most remarkable features of economic life since 1914 [emphasis added].”

There is considerable historical irony in the fact that President Roosevelt ended Prohibition in 1933, only to enact another prohibition on the private ownership of gold, with consequences which are still unravelling in the “current” financial crisis: I say “current” because the problems of paper money have been unravelling ever since the decisions about gold related above were taken – just as the same President’s New Deal, with its state-backed savings and loans funds, is a fundamental cause of the subprime crisis.

The continuing furore over bankers’ pay led to the recent decision by Stephen Hester, the Chief Executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland, to forgo his contracted bonus, worth just under £1 million. Wayne Rooney, the popular footballer, earns that in five weeks.

Top executive pay in the banks hovers around £1.2 – £1.35 million; these salaries are complemented by bonuses, which are largely or entirely paid in shares. Total remuneration for bankers is therefore high (albeit that a large element, the bonuses, may be said to be nominal). But, compared to the remuneration of other high earners, is it excessive?

Wayne Rooney earns £18 million a year, a combination of pay, score bonuses and sponsorship fees. Yet he is not damned for greed. Pop stars and film stars earn as large if not larger incomes; in fact some earnings are so high it is hard to find out exactly how high they are – the singer Rihanna, for example, is rumoured to be worth £70 million but her total income and net worth are undisclosed.

We hear nothing, however, about the impulsive greed of such people. Footballers’ transfer fees, when they do cause eyebrows to be raised, are justified in the context of the competitive world of international football, and the explanation seems to be accepted, notwithstanding the huge discrepancy between what bankers and footballers earn. So whence the moral froth?

Footballers and singers and film makers give people pleasure; their fans follow them, paying to see their latest games or films or buying their latest songs. Their value as entertainers is taken for granted by their audiences; it is easy to understand what they do, thus their value for the individual is measured instantly as a factor of that individual’s enjoyment of their endeavours. It is equally understood that their earnings are simply an aggregate of the money that audiences willingly pay to be entertained by them.

Given that bankers exercise, and are expected to exercise, an enormous responsibility for the deposits and savings of their clients, why is this fact not equally well understood? Presumably because the actual workings of the banking system and high finance are not amenable to the sort of instant understanding that facilitates the benign regard in which entertainers are held. That is, the fury directed at bankers is born of sheer ignorance.

There is another moral issue that lies behind this debate, and that is the way in which poverty (and therefore wealth) has come to be defined in the affluent west: it has ceased to be defined in absolute terms. The Poverty Site states the case for “relative poverty” thus:
“The view that relative poverty is not important is a perfectly valid position to take – it is just not the view that the authors of this website, along with most other researchers, the EU, the UK government, and politicians of all hues across the political spectrum take. So, for example, the government’s target of halving child poverty by 2010 is defined in terms of relative poverty.”

At least this makes it admirably clear that “relative poverty” is defined politically, that it is a political tool, designed to justify high taxation and providing politicians with their raison d’etre. Such a definition therefore helps perpetuate our contemporary intrusive and anti-wealth creation political system. The politicians needed someone to blame when that system imploded – and footballers just didn’t seem to fit the bill…

We continue to examine the folly of the modern mortgage, following our previous discussions on Golcoin.org in When Debt’s called Credit and When Debts called Credit 2.

There are many reasons why members of what we ought to call the pseudo-propertied classes might need to sell the houses on which they are paying a mortgage, even if the primary reason for owning the mortgage was to have a home rather than an investment asset. Those reasons may include the break-up of a marriage, a growing family needing more room, or the need to move to take up employment.

However, if the market has dried up, there are no buyers. This means that the pseudo-owner has negative equity in the property – the house is now worth less than the mortgage that still must be paid off. There are various ways in which this can be calculated but the honestly stated value is now – zero. No buyer, no value, only a liability.

Late last year a particularly galling instance of this problem was reported: that while middle management jobs are to be found in the South-East of England, those who live in mortgaged properties elsewhere in the country cannot avail themselves of these employment opportunities because they cannot sell their houses. If they are at risk of losing, or have lost, their jobs where they live, or simply wish to earn a larger salary as their families grow they are effectively trapped by their mortgage.

It is also reported that in many cities in the U.K. it is now cheaper to buy than to rent; this should really come as no surprise as this simply enlarges on the fact that it has been made cheaper to buy because of the credit available to do so. The more houses are bought up, the less properties are available to rent, and so rents climb. Renting of course answers the need for flexibility in terms of being able to move as jobs become available, or the family grows.

Yet owning your own home has long been trumpeted as a form of security, both for oneself and for one’s locality. Home ownership was widely encouraged through mortgage tax relief in the 1980s. Homes were seen as a bulwark against daft left-wing local authorities, the reasoning being that the greater the number of people who owned their homes, the more they had a direct interest in how their local authorities were run, in part because the rates they paid became visible to them as householders (rather than being an invisible component of the rent which the landlord charged them). This may have been a laudable aim – but mortgage tax relief was not the answer, as it became one of the chief engines of rapidly over-expanded credit, and therefore the heightened insecurity we are all now experiencing.

In the United States it is estimated that 50% of mortgage holders are “underwater”: “When factoring in second mortgage debt, seller closing costs, and sales commission, more than 50% of owners with a mortgage are unable to sell their homes and pay off their debts.” For more on this enormous tally of insecurity go to Irvine Housing Blog:

by Mark Rogers

France’s loss of the triple A rating sharpens the focus on what needs to be done to avoid the Eurozone’s crisis deepening further. What happens in France in the immediate as well as the long term future is therefore of concern to those outside France as well as those within. This week it was made clear that through increased IMF funding, the UK is likely to be contributing to the bail out funds, although the UK remains committed to countries not currencies. Of particular concern to English readers is the likely reaction in France to the required social reforms. And of course the flight into gold helps strengthen the hand of the wise investor.

The loss of the triple A is only one of the superficial symptoms of the trends of 2012. The economic crisis continues to deepen, which may well cause the price of gold to climb more quickly than envisaged, but not initially.

The consequences for the economy…

This is not due to having been warned of the possibility of such a loss. Since October last year, the agency Moody had been holding the sword of Damocles over Gallic heads.
The downgrading of the French credit rating from AAA to AA by the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s has far graver consequences than would be implied by the speeches of leaders who wish to give reassurances, a mere few months ahead of the elections.

The interest rates at which France borrows and which are already twice as high as those of Germany will increase, to cover the risk of default. The first direct impact on the economy is the flight of investors and thus a fall in the CAC 40 index.
And for individuals
Higher interest rates on mortgages, tax hikes, diminished access to credit… the French will have to curb their spending. All the large companies in which the State has a stake (EDF, GDF, France Telecom, Renault, SNCF…) will see their financing costs increase, which inevitably will impact the expenditure of individuals, not to mention the degradation of public services.

Is the A lost forever?

Of course, France can regain its triple A, but how soon and, especially, at what cost?
The corporate VAT plan is only a tiny initiative when viewed in the light of the catastrophic impact of such a downgrading. According to Norbert Gaillard, consultant at the World Bank, France can only recover its AAA at the expense of important social reforms and “a drastic reduction in public expenditure”. Flexibility of the job market for greater competitiveness, extending the period of contributions to pension funds, elimination of the 35 hour working week… Are the French ready to give up their social gains whilst increasing their daily expenditure? Working more and earning less money?

The consequences for gold

As soon as the credit rating of a country is downgraded, the cautious markets fall, demand for gold increases and hence its price. Initially, the need of banks for liquidity can result in a massive withdrawal following the resale of credit and a fall in the price of gold on the markets, as has been already more or less the case since December. One should therefore take the opportunity to strengthen one’s position on gold and buy now because the secondary effect once the selling off stops will see: gold reach new highs this year breaking the $2000 an ounce barrier and beyond.

Fools or Gold?

Once the dominoes of Debt start to tumble the skies the limit but more importantly, when states fail, currencies collapse or sovereign debt strangles everyday life, where would you rather have your “money”?
In a tangible precious asset with perennial true value?
Or tied up in the worldwide web of debt derivatives, Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and untraceable off-ledger accounts?

The choice is simple, give your money to the crooks you’ve been conditioned to trust with blind faith and risk losing everything or buy something solid that you own and trust yourself to manage it properly?

It’s what they call a no-brainer!

It is taken for granted that to qualify as a banker one must be greedy. The proposition is so silly that it is distressing to note how widespread is its acceptance. Of course there are greedy bankers, just as there are greedy butchers, bakers and train drivers; yet if banking was based on greed, it couldn’t exist. (This is another example of the misunderstanding of self-interest: see  Austerity for you – privileges for Politicians, December 16th, 2011).
The web of trust that is banking could never have come into existence if it was driven by the unqualified greed of all those who tried to participate. Banking arose out of the need of merchants to protect their monetary assets from theft en route as they travelled about Europe trading. They established networks of trust, whereby assets, often gold, could be placed in a secure depository, and redeemed through paper pledges at other trusted depositories, thus ensuring that the merchant carried as little as possible of his wealth about with him. This web of trust is the basic principle which still governs modern banking, and without it the system would collapse.
Isn’t the system already collapsing; doesn’t this prove that governments and people no longer trust the bankers because they are greedy? And the answer to the problem? Legislation: there must be more regulations to fetter the bankers, and to make them pay.
The trouble is they already do. Take bonuses: they are taxed as bonuses, and not as part of income, at a 40-50% rate. The greater a banker’s earnings, the more he already “contributes”. The level of income even without bonuses ensures that the wealthiest people in the country pay a huge percentage of the nation’s taxes, which are largely wasted: the tax-funded welfare state is notoriously inefficient, and a main driver of inflation.

The curious aspect of the demand for regulation is that it is MPs who are to be the overseers of this legislative campaign against greed. There is a strange dichotomy in the democratic mind: nobody much trusts politicians (though like bankers there are eminently worthy men and women to be found amongst them); nevertheless we entrust our health, our education, and all manner of things the state really has no business being involved in, to just these unloved politicians.
The question arises as to whether playing to the masses, which is what democratic politics now largely consists of, is likely to produce viable policies to prevent another crisis. In an editorial in the London Evening Standard, 19 December 2011, concerning the likelihood that parliamentary and public pressure will force the Chancellor to accept the Vickers recommendation on banking reform that banks must separate their investment and retail banking operations, it was pointed out that “[s]ome of the banks most exposed to the sub-prime crash – notably Northern Rock – did not conduct investment bank-style ‘proprietary trading’. Conversely, Lehman Brothers conducted only such activity, having no retail arm. Then again, Barclays Capital, Barclays’ investment banking arm, survived the crisis.”
In other words a key recommendation is based on prejudice and not the facts. So much for financial probity!

By Mark Rogers

Watch the Ads they didn’t want you to see here – read on

There are many theories surrounding the manipulation of the Gold Market and the Gold Spot price but few doubt that it takes place, orchestrated by some greater beings that seek to control the money supply.

In a recent cynical twist, gold has been effectively censored off the air of a host of major US TV Networks working in collusion with the Obama administration and the Fed.
An established gold investment company recently made two TV ads to be aired across the networks. The ads feature caricatures of Obama, Bernanke and Pat Boone who narrates the story. The latter works for the company Swiss America and has long been an advocate of the virtues of gold versus dollars.
The first of the ads takes a humorous jibe at Bernanke’s Wall Street reputation for being “helicopter Ben” , ready to dump money on a crisis.

“made-up” reasons for ban?

The reasons given for rejecting the ads vary from ;
• Comcast who explained that it “doesn’t meet our standards on public symbol. The Comcast Public Symbol Policy apparently specifies that the “use of the name or likeness of the President of the United States and/or the Presidential Seal for endorsing commercial purposes must be authorized by the White House.”
• Fox News said the “representation of public figures is something we try to avoid.”
• CNN/HLN told Swiss America the commercials were “not appropriate for the current political landscape.”

Swiss America CEO Craig Smith said “The networks’ reaction shocked me,” Smith said. “It’s a threat to First Amendment rights when a commercial message is rejected not because it is inaccurate or misleading, but because it makes what is perceived to be a political statement the networks want to avoid.”

Smith told WND he was concerned that the networks were protecting Obama and Bernanke.
“All we are saying in these two commercials is what dozens of responsible professional economists are saying every day,” Smith said;

“Gold investment as a responsible diversification strategy when governments printing of fiat currencies with abandon risk unleashing inflationary principles.”

Inflationary pressures are building globally and no-one has an answer to them rising and the consequent economic impact.
It is a common known fact that storing gold through a crisis and inflation is the BEST way to protect your wealth value and its purchasing power. This has been the case for 6000 years.

Gold can never be worth zero – it has intrinsic value.
Fiat currency can become worthless – its only value is that of a piece of paper

The Ban backfires

However, the censorship has backfired as Google TV accepted the ads which will eventually be shown throughout the networks via Google TV!
These humorous videos tell a very straight and simple story and the only possible reason for banning them is because of how close to the TRUTH they really are – and that hurts the Politocrats who believe they are all supreme and mighty to judge over us, control us and bankrupt us.

They are so desperate to cling on to power they will do anything – except we are not the fools they take us for – are we?

Is the Europen Union real?

The crisis of the Euro is demonstrating a fundamental lack of credibility in the institutions of the European Union. Throughout, the European Commission has consistently taken a back seat, as if it really had no idea what was going on, let alone what to do about it.

All parties to the state of the single currency share this lack of credibility and not least because the euro was never credible anyway. Its launch was deferred for a year because the poorer member nations were nowhere near the narrow margin either side of parity with the Deutsche Mark which was the fundamental condition for entry into the new currency.

That fact alone shows what a queer creature the Euro is. The Maastricht Treaty created the European Union to give Europe a single market, a single currency – to become a single State. That there are rules as to who was in the single currency already beggars the question as to what forms a cohesive state.

The rules were for a time adhered to; a year on from the original date of the launch, though nothing had changed, political ambition got the upper hand and the Euro was born: the claim was made that delaying any longer would only call the project’s credibility into doubt.

What was done, however, was incredible: this attempt to unite anyway widely disparate economies by breaking the first rule of admission generated an educated scepticism on the part of several British economists, who outlined the demise of the Euro, down to the detail that Greece would collapse first.

A week after the summit which agreed new fiscal rules (the problem with the old ones, apart from the whole air of unreality investing the project, was that they were never adhered to, a fault it is hard to see the new ones mending), a leader in The Times of London (16 December 2011) pointed out that “Mr Sarkozy secured his goal of framing the new fiscal rules as an inter-governmental agreement rather than a treaty backed by the European Union’s institutions.”

Eurozone Union?

This is even more incredible: in order to commit to more binding state-like ties, in order to chase that ever-elusive credibility, the Euro currency nations are going their own way outside the boundaries of the European Union’s institutions – yet still blithely calling it “The European Union”. What, in this light, is one to make of the European Central Bank’s position? What is the status of the Commission? What does the old cry “further and deeper union” mean now?

The other side of this coin is that there can now be no question that what is driving all this is the national interests of the two most powerful states, which are determined to pull the poorer nations, whether or not it is in their interests, after them, and in doing so divide the Union.

As with all advanced democracies, and this is something the euro crisis has exposed mercilessly, there is a further division within the nations between the political class and the ordinary public: the politicians persist in their unreal aspirations, risking jobs and investments.

The People decide while Politics prevaricates?

A little item of Christmas realism? Vendors at a Christmas market in at least one German town are advertising their willingness to accept – Deutsche Marks! (Exchange rate €1 = 2 DM)

by Mark Rogers